The journal of Arts 1\1anagement and Law but is otherwise lifelike. Of course, even that statement is not literally true either, when the photograph is not in color or the color is known to corre spond only slightly to what our eyes see.
More broadly, our perception of reality is a social construct. It is not surprising that artists should be one profession, probably the first , to realize the truth of that concept; but it is important for you to realize, whether you are a lawyer or not, that such a perception is not only true of the arts, but is true of the law. And it is true of the world around us; the way we see the vvorld is a social construct. It is the way we view reality; much of what we think of as simply a description of reality is also a social construct. That is not to say it's wrong, not to say it is an illusion or delusion. It's something more complex.
vVhat I want to talk about is what I refer to as the notion of a con sciousness of work. There has been in our society for the last couple of hun dred vears a consciousness of work-I call it the prevailing consciousness which has had an enormous impact on the way \Ve think about work and on the \\·av the law of work has e\·olved. There is also an alternative conscious ness of work, a different way of looking at it. It is interesting to think about this idea in the context of the arts. It is obvious that in many ways the ar tistic professions are the home of that alternative consciousness. I will say more about that in a moment, but I first want to spell out what I mean by a consciousness of \vork: an entire set of mutually reinforcing premises, priorities, and perceptions that answer the question, "vVhat do people do when thcv work.)" We have a set of answers to those questions that some times is largely implicit: thev are not stated or are sometimes stated as if they are self-e\·ident, as simply a description of reality. This room is rec tangular: that is a picture of a beach; the lights are on. Those perceptions are not \·iewed as social constructs. Thev are viewed as simple descriptions of fact.
VVhat is the prevailing consciousness of work0 In tvvo words, it is that work is an exchange relation. It's a contract. It is the giving up of leisure in exchange for something else. Economists say, of course, that leisure is a good thing: vou give up leisure, you \VOrk, and vou get something back.
Thar is a short ans,,er that has an awful lot riding with it. A number of things llO\\ from that view. I don't want to dwell on all of them, but let me mention SC\'Cral. Most important, of course, is that such an analogy quickly unites the \\·ork relation to our traditional notions of contract and exchange, both in ]a,,· and in our ideologv generallv. It is a voluntary , bilateral rela tion. There is no right to \\·ork. There is no right to a job; there's simply a right, ih·ou will, to look for one. Iv iore salient, perhaps, is the idea that the utilicv of '::hat a .,_, orker does is external to the worker. Utili tv is largelv defined bv the user. initiallv the employer-will somebody hire vou"!-anc! .JO Vol. J 6, Jlfo. 2 Artists, Workers, and the Law of vVork ulti ma tely society because the employer is typically hiring you in order to sell something that you helped make or do. So I can imagine myself a basso profunda, but nobody credits that unless somebody's willing to pay me to sing. The same thing goes for being a lavvyer, a waiter, a cab driver, or any thin g else. it is true of all jobs. The role that you have is not defined by you, except in the sense that you took the job. In the legal sense vou took it voluntarily: you might have been delighted; it might be a wonderful job; you might feel you are being overpaid or overvalued; it might be a terrible job; you might feel you are being exploited; you might have had six choices; vou might have been unemployed for a year. In some sense those factors all matter, but thev do not change the fact that once vou take the job, the role is de fined for you by the job and initially bv the employer.
There is a wonderful case that illustrates all of this. It is one of the deci sions that has been corning along in the last ten years, attempting to limit the employer's power to discharge emplovees at will where there is no col lective bargaining agreement. The cast: invoked a salesman who sold steel products and who thought that a new product \vas unsafe. He told his boss, "You know, I don't think it's really a good product. You shouldn't sell it."
The boss said, "Don't worry, the engineers have cleared it." which they had. Still the salesman was troubled. He didn ' t call Ralph Nader: he didn't go to the newspapers. He vvent to the vice president of the company, vvho happened to be his personal friend, and told him, "You knm,v, you really ought to look into this. I think thev made a mistake." So the company looked into it, and they found the statesmanlike personnel solution. They recalled the product and fired the salesman.
He brought a suit, vvhich had no statutorv basis, and he argued the ob vious point-that there is a strong public policy in safetv, in not letting employers fire people for pressing this kind of complaint. The court's answer was this:
Certainly the potential for abuc'e of an employer's power of dismissal is par-
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The Journal of Arts lv fmza § ; en1ent and Law ticularly serious when an employee must exercise independent expert judg ment. But Gear y does not hold himself out as this sort of emplovee. He was in volved onl\' in the sale of products. Ther·e is no suggestion that he possessed any expert qualifications or that his duties extended to making judgments in matters of product safe tv.
In other vvords, as evervone knovvs, if you're a salesman, you are supposed to say hmv great the product is, not how bad it is. He wasn't an engineer;
he wasn't a safety person. If he cared about safety-whether because he cared about the company's reputation, his own reputation, or what hap pened to other people, or just because he cared-that was his own business.
He could do whatever he wanted about that on his own time. He could write a book. or he could look for another job. But it was not part of his job.
VVhv not ? Because the job was not defined to include caring about safety.
The case is a good example of an endemic attribute of the prevailing notion about work. So when the panelists spoke about regional theatre and the notion of an ensemble, it was to suggest a value in working together. What is the basis of that value? vVhen I was in college, certain schools played good basketball because the players grew up in the same neighborhood and played together for ten years so they could beat the hell out of everyone else. That suggests one reason why it is important to work together. But ,,, hat I heard at this morning's panel was something that went beyond that. Wholly apart from the commodity value of ensembles is another value acting communally and being involved with people you care about, having iess dissonance between home life and work life. And all of that rests on the notion that your incJi,·idualitv is partlv constitu ted by your relation to others; that is, the value societv places on what you do is not expressed solelv as a transaction, but as a relationship.
\Vhat strikes me is that, in many ways, the alternative consciousness is the consciousness of the artist. It is also the consciousness of the profes sional. If this were a con ference of lawvers or teachers and there were lawvers and teachers in the room, I could make the same analysis. Tradi tionall v, the professions are in ner-c!irectecl, more tenuously connected to the market, and so forth. I would like to suggest a hypothesis: it is difficult and problematic, I think, to make much headway in achieving legitimacy in the world for that alternative consciousness for the art s if it is viewed as separate from the -. vorld of \\Ork generallv. Galbraith , perhaps for rhetori cal purposes, drew a \'(T\' sharp dis<inction between certain tvpes of work. I see it more as a ccmin u um. I c an de:scri be it with three hypotheses. First, the traditional consciousness of work both shapes the law and is reinforced bv the law. It's a mutually reinforcing set of ideas. 
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Th e jo urnal of Arts Jvfanagement and Law judgment because it is the university 's policy, in its self-in terest , t o hir e people on that basis. In other words, as a teacher I have independen ce of judgment because the university vvants me to have it. That was news t o me , and it was not exactly reassuring. It is also interesting that in calling me an independent professional, the court vvas not raising my status but was tak ing awav a legal right. one I mav or may not have wanted , but which I otherwise would have had. It has doubtless been the increasing bureaucra cization, the declining autonomy of professions like teaching that has led to such de\·elopments as unionization. The view that the professions are dif ferent is expressed to make people in those fields more vulnerable to tech nological and societal changes that are making the differences less real.
So the task that I see for us, penetrating the limitations of the tradi tional co nsciousness in attempting to construct legal principles that are responsive to something broader, is one that the fiel d of the arts is central to. but that goes far bevond it.
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